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Stereotypes can influence social perception in undesirable ways. However, 
activated stereotypes are not always applied in judgments. The present research 
investigated how stereotype activation and application processes impact social 
judgments as a function of available resources for control over stereotypes. 
Specifically, we varied the time available to intervene in the stereotyping 
process, and used multinomial modeling to independently estimate stereotype 
activation and application. As expected, social judgments were less stereotypic 
when participants had more time to intervene. In terms of mechanisms, 
stereotype application, and not stereotype activation, corresponded with 
reductions in stereotypic biases. With increasing time, stereotype application 
was reduced, reflecting the fact that controlling application is time-dependent. 
In contrast, stereotype activation increased with increasing time, apparently due 
to increased engagement with stereotypic material. Thus, stereotype activation 
was highest when judgments were least stereotypical. Thus, reduced 
stereotyping may coincide with increased stereotype activation if stereotype 
application is simultaneously decreased. 
 
Keywords: prejudice/stereotyping; self-regulation; implicit cognition; multinomial modeling
A vast literature in psychological science 
demonstrates that stereotypes influence social 
judgment (e.g., Hamilton & Sherman, 1994). In 
part, this influence reflects the fact that 
stereotypes are readily activated, or made 
accessible, upon perceiving members of distinct 
social groups (e.g., Kunda, Davis, Adams, & 
Spencer, 2002; Kunda & Spencer, 2003). Indeed, 
stereotype activation frequently exhibits 
characteristics of automaticity. For example, 
perceiving a stereotypic image can lead to 
stereotype activation even when the image is 
incidental to current goals or is perceived outside 
of awareness entirely (Kawakami et al., 2003; 
Lepore & Brown, 1997). Considerable research 
has additionally shown that stereotypes are more 
likely to influence judgments when processing 
resources are scarce, supporting the view that 
stereotyping is an efficient process (Sherman, 
Macrae, & Bodenhausen, 2000). 
Though stereotypic biases are pervasive, in 
some circumstances people are able to correct for 
their biases (e.g., Monteith, Ashburn-Nardo, 
Voils, & Czopp, 2002; Monteith, Sherman, & 
Devine, 1998). Thus, there is a conceptual 
distinction between the activation of stereotypes 
and their application to judgment (e.g., Gilbert & 
Hixon, 1991). Activated stereotypes are not 
always applied and, sometimes, judgments are 
contrasted or corrected away from activated 
stereotypes. The distinction between stereotype 
activation and application is critical to 
understanding when stereotypes will or will not 
bias judgments and to understanding how to 
effectively intervene to influence stereotyping. 
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Operating Conditions of Stereotype 
Activation and Application 
Prominent models of stereotyping propose 
distinct roles for stereotype activation and 
application. For example, Devine’s (1989) dual-
process model proposed that stereotype 
activation is inescapable among individuals with 
knowledge of those stereotypes. However, the 
influence of activated stereotypes on judgment 
can be modulated depending on the perceiver’s 
concurrent processing goals and their ability to 
correct for the influence of active stereotypes. 
Fazio and colleagues (1995) also emphasize the 
role of corrective processes following stereotype 
activation, positing that stereotypes are 
automatically activated upon encountering 
members of another group, but that corrective 
processes can intervene to modulate their 
influence. Motivations and situational conditions 
conducive to the operation of corrective 
processes are critical (Fazio, 1990; Fazio et al., 
1995). When people are motivated to correct 
against biasing influences and conditions are 
sufficient for the operation of corrective 
processes, then judgments will deviate from 
activated stereotypic knowledge. 
The models proposed by Devine and Fazio are 
reflective of a broad consensus that stereotype 
activation is relatively more automatic (i.e., 
unintentional, resistant to interference, outside of 
awareness, and efficient) than corrective 
processes that prevent the application of 
stereotypes to judgment (e.g., Hamilton & 
Sherman, 1994). An important implication is that 
the conditions that permit stereotype activation 
are assumed to be less restrictive than are the 
conditions that permit correction. Thus, factors 
that selectively interfere with stereotype 
correction should increase stereotyping by 
increasing the likelihood that stereotypes will be 
applied in judgments. Conversely, factors that 
increase the ability to intervene should reduce 
stereotyping via reduced application. 
Resource-Dependent Stereotype Activation  
Though the broad characterization of 
stereotype activation as automatic and stereotype 
application as controlled has been the consensual 
view of stereotyping for some time, there are 
hints that it may be oversimplified. For example, 
work by Gilbert and Hixon (1991) showed that 
the availability of cognitive resources influenced 
both stereotype activation and application. In 
particular, the presence of a cognitive load while 
encountering stereotypic content reduced the 
extent to which stereotypes were activated. 
Additionally, stereotypic judgments were 
particularly likely if 1) participants were not 
cognitively busy during a stereotype activation 
phase (and, therefore, had stereotypes activated) 
and 2) were busy during a stereotype application 
phase (and, therefore, could not correct for 
stereotypic influence). Completing a 
simultaneous task appeared to influence both 
stereotype activation and stereotype application, 
challenging the prevailing notion that stereotype 
activation is categorically automatic. 
 ‘Automatic’ Corrective Processes 
Other research has challenged the idea that 
stereotype-correcting processes are necessarily 
resource-intensive. Glaser and Kihlstrom’s 
(2006) Compensatory Automaticity model 
asserts that habitual correction for stereotypic 
biases routinizes corrective processes such that 
preventing the application of stereotypes need not 
be deliberate and resource-intensive, and that 
people can rapidly shift the likelihood that they 
apply activated stereotypes to judgments. These 
corrective shifts have been observed even on 
implicit tasks that are typically thought to 
preclude intentional, resource-dependent 
processes (Glaser & Kihlstrom, 2006; Glaser & 
Knowles, 2008; Sherman, 2006; Sherman et al., 
2008). 
Providing additional support for efficient 
stereotype correction, Moskowitz and colleagues 
(Moskowitz, Gollwitzer, Wasel, & Schall, 1999; 
Moskowitz & Li, 2011) have shown that 
stereotype activation can be pre-consciously 
inhibited when people chronically pursue 
egalitarian goals or when egalitarian goals are 
made salient. These inhibitory mechanisms can 
operate under conditions thought to preclude the 
operation of strategic processes. Specifically, 
those who pursue egalitarian goals appear to 
inhibit stereotype activation, even on sequential 
priming measures using brief stimulus onset 
asynchronies, which significantly limit the time 
available to correct for stereotyping. Altogether, 
these results indicate that the characterizations of 
stereotype activation as automatic and stereotype 
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application (and correction) as controlled may be 
overly simplified. 
Measuring Stereotype Activation and 
Application 
Progress in understanding the impact and 
nature of stereotype activation and application 
has been hampered by methodological 
limitations. In particular, the presumption that 
stereotype activation is automatic whereas 
stereotype application or its converse, stereotype 
correction, is non-automatic has formed the 
theoretical rationale for measuring activation and 
application with different experimental tasks. 
Because it is assumed to be an automatic process 
(unintentional, resource independent, lacking 
awareness, spontaneous), stereotype activation 
has generally been assessed with implicit 
measures (e.g., IAT, sequential priming), which 
are commonly understood to measure the 
activation of mental associations and preclude the 
influence of controlled cognitive processes. In 
contrast, because stereotype correction is 
assumed to be a non-automatic process 
(intentional, resource dependent, involving 
awareness, strategic), it has generally been 
assessed with explicit judgment tasks, which are 
presumed to reflect controlled cognitive 
processes while minimizing the influence of 
automatic processing. 
An implicit assumption of this ‘task 
dissociation’ approach (for a review, see 
Sherman, Krieglmeyer, & Calanchini, 2014) is 
that the tasks used to measure stereotype 
activation and stereotype application are process-
pure–that is, that they uniquely measure the 
process in question without contamination from 
other mental processes. In other words, the task 
dissociation approach assumes that measures of 
activation (e.g., sequential priming task) reflect 
only differences in activation and not differences 
in application, whereas measures of application 
(e.g., explicit judgment task) reflect only 
application. Returning to Gilbert and Hixon’s 
(1991) work investigating the automaticity of 
stereotype activation and application, we find an 
example of this approach. Participants in Gilbert 
and Hixon’s (1991) experiments completed a 
word-fragment completion task in which each 
fragment could be completed in either a 
stereotype-relevant or stereotype-irrelevant way. 
The number of stereotypic word completions was 
interpreted as an index of stereotype activation, 
uncontaminated by stereotype application or the 
prevention thereof. On a subsequent task, 
participants judged the degree to which their 
Asian or White interaction partner possessed 
stereotypic traits. This task was assumed to 
measure the degree to which participants would 
apply or prevent the application of stereotypes to 
their judgments. However, there is now a great 
deal of evidence that measures of stereotype 
activation, even implicit measures (e.g., 
sequential priming, IAT), also reflect the 
influence of stereotype application and corrective 
processes (Krieglmeyer & Sherman, 2012; 
Sherman et al., 2008). Likewise, explicit 
judgment tasks used to measure stereotype 
application are necessarily influenced by the 
extent of stereotype activation. Thus, it is difficult 
to determine the extent to which performance on 
either kind of task reflects stereotype activation, 
stereotype application, or mixtures of both 
processes. The task-dissociation approach 
precludes strong conclusions about the conditions 
under which these processes do or do not occur. 
The Present Research 
The present research is the first investigation 
into the operating conditions of stereotype 
activation and application that does not rely on 
the task dissociation approach. In this line of 
work we use the Stereotype Misperception Task 
(SMT; Krieglmeyer & Sherman, 2012), a 
sequential priming procedure designed 
specifically to disentangle the joint influences of 
stereotype activation and application processes. 
A mathematical model of SMT task performance 
independently assesses the extents of stereotype 
activation and application within the same task 
and under identical conditions, avoiding the 
inherent problematic assumptions of task 
dissociation. In this line of work, we investigate 
the roles of stereotype activation and application 
under conditions that vary the time available to 
correct for the influence of stereotypes, providing 
a direct test of the extent to which the processes 
of stereotype activation and application operate 
efficiently and the extent to which they are 
dependent on the opportunity for intentional 
processing. We also examine how stereotype 
activation and application relate to biases in 
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judgment, and how those relationships may be 
affected by the opportunity for intentional 
processing. 
In the current variant of the SMT, participants 
judged a series of pixelated target faces according 
to their level of threat. Prior to viewing these 
target faces, participants were briefly exposed to 
photographs of Black or White male prime faces. 
In past research, exposure to these Black or White 
primes influenced how threatening the target 
faces were judged to be. To examine the influence 
of processing resources on stereotyping, 
stereotype activation, and stereotype application, 
we varied the time separating onset of prime and 
target images, or stimulus onset asynchrony 
(SOA). Previous research has shown that the 
influence of primes on target judgments is 
reduced with longer SOAs (Fazio et al., 1995). As 
such, we expected that, as SOA increased, the 
influence of racial primes on judgments oftarget 
images would be reduced. Most importantly, we 
apply a statistical model that allows us to derive 
independent estimates of stereotype activation 
and application to shed light on how these 
processes relate to stereotyping, and how they are 
influenced by SOA. The influence of stereotypes 
may be reduced as SOA increases because 
stereotype activation is diminished, either due to 
inhibition of the stereotype (Moskowitz & Li, 
2011; Monteith et al., 1998) or to passive decay 
of activated stereotypic knowledge (Kunda et al., 
2002). But increases in SOA might also allow 
people to better prevent the application of 
activated stereotypes to their judgments (e.g., 
Glaser & Knowles, 2008; Sherman et al., 2008). 
In this case, it is not the extent of stereotype 
activation that is critical, but the degree to which 
people apply active stereotypes. Application of 
the SMT model allows us to independently test 
how SOA affects each of these mechanisms and 
the likelihood that they contribute to reductions 
in stereotypic judgments.  																																																													
1 Data from an additional 12 participants were 
collected because data collection proceeded more 
quickly than expected. Analyses were only performed 
on the full dataset and at no prior time. Sensitivity 
power analysis indicated that the final sample of 90 
participants allowed us to detect an effect size of dz = 
.299 at 1-β = .80. 
2 We set two a priori criteria for exclusion of data for 
each experiment. First, participants who utilized a 
Experiment 1 
Participants 
In Experiment 1 we sought to collect data 
from at least 80 participants. In total 92 
undergraduate students 1  at University of 
California, Davis participated in the experiment 
for partial course credit (71.1 percent female, 
Mage = 18.9 years; 58 percent Asian, 21 percent 
Caucasian, 20 percent Latino/a). Participants 
completed the experiment as the second of three 
unrelated tasks in an hour-long experimental 
session. Based on previously reported effect sizes 
from Krieglmeyer and Sherman (2012; d = 1.04), 
Experiment 1 was powered well above .95 to 
detect stereotypic bias in the SMT procedure. 
However, we were specifically interested in 
changes in bias resulting from our within-subjects 
manipulation of SOA. After choosing our desired 
sample size, sensitivity analysis in G*Power 3.1 
indicated that 80 participants would allow us to 
detect an effect size of dz = .317, corresponding 
to a small to medium effect, with power set at 1-
β = .80 (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009). 
Power analysis in subsequent experiments relies 
on observed effects of the SOA manipulation. 
Two participants were excluded from analyses 
for using a single key response for all trials. 2 
Including these data in analyses does not change 
the direction or statistical interpretation of the 
reported results.  
Stimuli 
Prime stimuli consisted of photographs of 24 
Black and 24 White males, each approximately 
20-30 years old. Each face was cropped at the 
base of the neck and superimposed on a plain grey 
background (see Phills, Kawakami, Tabi, 
Nadolny, & Inzlicht, 2011). In addition to these, 
we included a set of ‘neutral’ prime images that 
contained no racial cues. These consisted of the 
outline of a face superimposed on a grey 
background (see Krieglmeyer & Sherman, 2012). 
single key for every trial were excluded (e.g., Payne, 
Cheng, Govorun, & Stewart, 2005; Krieglmeyer & 
Sherman, 2012). Second, we excluded participants 
whose proportion of “more threatening” responses 
fell 2.5 standard deviations outside the sample 
distribution (see Krieglmeyer & Sherman, 2012). 	
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Target stimuli consisted of 48 computer-
generated face morphs created by Oosterhof and 
Todorov (2008) to vary systematically in 
perceived threat. Each of the computer-generated 
images depicts a male face with morphed facial 
features that were either two standard deviations 
above or below the neutral point of threat. These 
images were distorted with a pixilation filter 
using photo-editing software to increase their 
ambiguity. Target images differ objectively along 
the dimension of evaluation in order to apply the 
multinomial processing tree model to the data 
(see “Multinomial Modeling Analyses” section 
below). The choice of +/-2 standard deviations 
was made to be consistent with the original 
validation of the SMT procedure reported in 
Krieglmeyer & Sherman (2012).3 
Procedure 
In each session, one to four participants 
completed experimental procedures individually 
in separate computer cubicles. After providing 
informed consent, participants learned that the 
experiment was concerned with rapid impression 
formation. Participants then viewed SMT task 
instructions and completed twelve practice trials 
of the SMT procedure. Two test blocks of the 
SMT procedure followed the practice trials. After 
completing SMT test blocks, participants 
completed several exploratory measures, a brief 
demographic questionnaire (age, sex, ethnicity), 
and an experimental debriefing.4 
Stereotype Misperception Task. The 
Stereotype Misperception Task developed by 
Krieglmeyer and Sherman (2012) served as the 
dependent measure. The structure of the SMT is 
similar to commonly used sequential priming 
measures (e.g., Affect Misattribution Procedure; 
Payne et al., 2005). In the present experiment, 
participants were instructed to “respond as 
quickly as possible,” judging each target face 
morph as either ‘more threatening’ or ‘less 
threatening’ than the average target. Each target 
was preceded by one of the three prime types 
(Black face, White face, or neutral face outline). 
Participants were explicitly informed to not 
respond to the prime faces but to attend to them 
for later questions. Because of these explicit 																																																													
3 Readers can view and download all target images 
used in this study at: osf.io/pqbhf/ 
instructions, any influence of the prime faces on 
threat judgments is assumed to be unintentional.  
The two SMT test blocks consisted of 72 trials 
each and included a self-paced break between the 
two blocks. Each trial began with a fixation cross 
for 500-ms. A prime image was presented for 
150-ms following the fixation cross. On half of 
the trials a blank screen was then displayed for 
175-ms, followed by onset of a target image. On 
the other half of the trials, target images were 
presented immediately after offset of prime 
images. This created trials with one of two 
within-subjects levels of SOA: 150-ms or 325-
ms. Target images were always shown for 100-
ms and were then replaced by a static visual mask 
that remained on the screen until the participant 
rendered a judgment. Participants indicated 
whether they judged the target to be more or less 
threatening than average by pressing either the 
“D” or “K” keys on a standard computer 
keyboard. The following trial began 500-ms after 
the previous judgment.  
Results 
Analytic Plan. The full design for Experiment 
1 was 3 (prime-type: Black vs. White vs. neutral) 
× 2 (target-type: high threat vs. low threat) × 2 
(SOA: 150-ms vs. 325-ms), with all factors 
manipulated within-subjects. Our analysis is 
comprised of two stages. In addition to 
quantifying the effect of SOA on mean levels of 
racial bias, we use the SMT multinomial 
processing tree model to disentangle the 
contribution of multiple component processes 
(see “Multinomial Processing Analyses” section 
below for a detailed description). 
In the first analytic stage, we investigate 
whether participants exhibited stereotypic biases 
in their judgments about target stimuli. The extent 
of bias on the SMT, called the SMT Effect, is 
determined by comparing responses on trials that 
include Black versus White prime faces (see 
Krieglmeyer & Sherman for validation of this 
index). We describe the traditional full factorial 
ANOVA analyses in the supplemental appendix 
because they are not the focus of the present 
findings. For the SMT, the design consists of 2 
prime levels (Black vs. White) and 2 SOA levels 
4 See Supplemental appendix Table A.2 for all 
demographic and exploratory measures by 
Experiment.  
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(150-ms vs. 325-ms). This analytic stage 
quantifies 1) the magnitude of racial bias in 
participants’ judgments, and 2) the degree to 
which SOA moderates racial bias in participants’ 
judgments.  
In the second analytic stage, we investigate 
how SOA influences the component processes of 
stereotype activation and application. Thus, in the 
second analytic stage we apply the SMT 
multinomial processing tree model, which has 
been developed and validated for exactly this 
purpose—to investigate patterns of responding 
across the SMT procedure (Krieglmeyer & 
Sherman, 2012; also see Payne, Hall, Cameron, 
& Bishara, 2010 for a similar approach with the 
Affect Misattribution Procedure). To accomplish 
this, the SMT model analysis includes responses 
to all three prime and both target types. 
SMT Effects. Our first research question 
pertained to the magnitude of stereotypic biases 
in threat judgments as a function of SOA. The 
SMT effect, an index of stereotypic bias, is 
calculated by subtracting the proportion of “more 
threatening” judgments on White prime trials 
from the proportion of “more threatening” 
judgments on Black prime trials (Krieglmeyer & 
Sherman, 2012).5 We calculated the SMT effect 
for both SOA conditions. The data confirmed our 
primary prediction; the SMT effect was stronger 
when SOA between prime and target images was 
150-ms versus 325-ms, t(89) = 4.074, p < .001; 
Hedges gav = .268; 95% CIdifference[.047,.137] (see 
Tables 1 and 2). To understand the mechanism(s) 
underlying this difference in bias, we employed 
multinomial modeling in the second analytic 
stage. 
 
--- Table 1 here --- 
 
--- Table 2 here --- 
 
Multinomial Modeling Analyses. We 
generated a set of equations representing the 
SMT process model that was developed and 
previously validated (see Krieglmeyer & 																																																													
5ANOVA analyses are detailed in the supplemental 
appendix. The pattern of ANOVA results 
(i.e.,significant racial bias and decreased bias at 
longer SOA) is not changed when target type is 
included as a factor and neutral is added as a third 
Sherman, 2012). The SMT process model 
estimates four latent parameters (see Figure 1). At 
the initial branch of the model tree, an activation 
(SAC) parameter captures activation of racial 
stereotypes. That is, to what extent do primes 
activate stereotypic schema (e.g., the stronger 
association of threat with Black than White 
men)? When stereotypes are active, a parameter 
representing application (SAP) captures whether 
those stereotypes are applied to judgment or 
whether judgments are corrected away from 
them. When threat stereotypes are not activated 
(1-SAC), a parameter representing detection (D) 
captures the ability to accurately detect target 
threat level and respond accordingly. Finally, 
when threat stereotypes are not activated (1-SAC) 
and target characteristics are not detected (1-D), 
a guessing parameter (G) captures general 
tendencies to respond with high- or low-threat 
judgments. 
 
--- Figure 1 here --- 
 
To further explicate the model, consider the 
case in which a participant is responding to a trial 
in which the prime face is Black and the target 
image is low in threat. In this case, the Black 
prime activates threat-related stereotypic content 
with the probability of SAC. If the stereotype is 
activated and it is applied to the judgment, the 
participant will render a “more threat” judgment 
with the probability of SAC × SAP. However, the 
participant may correct their judgment away from 
the activated stereotype, rendering a “low threat” 
judgment with the probability of SAC × (1 – 
SAP). If the Black prime does not activate the 
stereotype, participants may correctly detect the 
target image, rendering the “low threat” judgment 
with probability (1 – SAC) × D. If the stereotype 
is not activated and the extent of threat in the 
target image is not accurately detected, then the 
participant may guess “high threat” with 
probability (1 – SAC) × (1 – D) × G or, 
alternatively, may guess “low threat” with 
probability (1 – SAC) × (1 – D) × (1 – G). Thus, 
level within the prime type factor. As stated earlier, 
the target factor and neutral prime type are included 
in the experimental design because they are necessary 
for the SMT multinomial model (also see 
Krieglmeyer & Sherman, 2012). 
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the overall probability of a “high threat” response 
on this trial is: SAC × SAP + (1 – SAC) × (1 – D) 
× G. The probability of a “low threat” response 
is: SAC × (1 – SAP) + (1 – SAC) × D + (1 – SAC) 
× (1 – D) × (1 – G). According to the SMT, model 
estimates for SAP, D, and G are conditional 
probabilities, in that each parameter’s influence is 
dependent on the activity (or inactivity) of 
another parameter (e.g., G is conditional on the 
inactivity of stereotype activation and detection). 
In contrast, the estimate of SAC represents the 
unconditional probability of stereotype 
activation.  
Multinomial modeling analyses were 
conducted using the freely available multiTree 
computer package (Moshagen, 2010). This 
package implements a maximum likelihood 
framework to test the goodness of model fit and 
to estimate parameter values. Each of the four 
parameters is manipulated in an iterative process 
until the model’s expected frequencies most 
closely approximate the observed response 
frequencies. Parameter estimates vary between 0 
and 1, and represent the probability of process 
involvement. The magnitude of discrepancy 
between model expectations and observed 
frequencies is expressed in the G2 statistic and 
corresponding p-value. A non-significant result 
indicates that any discrepancy between the 
expected data and the observed data was not 
detectable. 
Modeling Results. Frequency counts of more 
and less threatening responses were aggregated 
for each of the SMT trial types. We fit the SMT 
process model equations to aggregated counts 
from trials in which the SOA was 150-ms and 
325-ms. When fit to the data, the model G2 
statistic suggested that the fit of the SMT model 
was acceptable, G2(4) = 6.461, p = .167. To 
further quantify the magnitude of misfit, we 
calculated the w coefficient, which can be thought 
of as the effect size of model misspecification 
after controlling for power (see Cressie, Pardo, & 
Pardo, 2003). The resulting estimate of w = .022 
																																																													
6 Additionally, we compared the performance of the 
SMT model to other frequently used process 
dissociation models (see supplemental appendix 
Table A.1). The SMT model unambiguously 
outperformed competitor models on AIC/BIC/MDL 
indicated that the magnitude of model misfit was 
small after controlling for power.6 
Our primary questions of interest center on 
whether model parameters reliably respond to 
changes in prime-target SOA. To compare model 
parameters across the two SOA conditions, we 
first fit a baseline model in which all parameters 
from the two SOA conditions were permitted to 
freely vary. By constraining corresponding 
parameters across SOA levels, we created nested 
models to test against the baseline model. The 
addition of any constraint necessarily reduces fit, 
increasing G2. Large reductions in model fit result 
in higher ΔG2 from baseline to nested models. 
Statistically significant p-values extracted from 
ΔG2 indicate that the constrained model should be 
rejected in favor of the baseline model. In other 
words, significant p-values suggest that 
parameters differ between the levels being 
compared and should, therefore, be 
independently estimated (as in the baseline 
model). It is important to point out that the SMT 
multinomial model estimates the cognitive 
processes that are thought to underlie 
stereotyping, but this modeling approach cannot 
separately estimate processes that are specific to 
particular stimuli. Thus, our investigation tests 
how SOA influences these domain-general 
stereotyping mechanisms. 
The D parameter could be collapsed across the 
two SOA levels without a statistical loss of model 
fit, ΔG2(1) = 0.457, p = .499, w = .004. This 
indicates that D did not detectably differ between 
the two SOA levels. Consistent with previously 
reported SMT data, the point estimate for D (see 
Table 3) was relatively low at both SOA levels, 
150-ms (D = 0.114; 95% CI[.083,.145]) and at 
325-ms (D = 0.131; CI[.093,.169]). However, 
that confidence intervals did not overlap with 0 
indicates that participants reliably discriminated 
between high- and low-threat targets. 
Likewise, the G parameter did not differ 
between SOA conditions, ΔG2(1) = 0.040, p = 
.841, w < .001. When no target or prime 
information was available to inform judgments, 
criteria in all experiments, with the exception that the 
AMP model maximized information on AIC criterion 
for Experiment 4 only. 	
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95% confidence intervals of the G parameter did 
not overlap with 0.5, indicating that participants 
tended to guess low-threat at both 150-ms (G = 
0.317; CI[.294,.341]) and 325-ms SOA (G = 
0.321; CI[.297,.344]).7 
Constraining the SAP parameter across the 
two SOA levels led to a significant loss of fit, 
ΔG2(1) = 56.950, p < .001, w = .066. This 
indicates that SAP differed significantly between 
SOA conditions. The tendency to apply active 
stereotypes was lower at 325-ms SOA (SAP = 
0.606; CI[.584,.629]) than at 150-ms (SAP = 
0.870; CI[.749,.990]). Confidence intervals for 
the SAP parameter did not overlap with 0.5 at 
either SOA, indicating that active stereotypes 
tended to be applied (versus corrected against) at 
both levels. 
The SAC parameter, likewise, differed 
between the two SOA levels, ΔG2(1) = 34.619, p 
< .001, w = .052. Unexpectedly, stereotype 
activation was higher at 325-ms SOA (SAC = 
0.767 CI[.676,.858]) compared with 150-ms 
SOA, (SAC = 0.345 CI[.235,.455]). Confidence 
intervals for SAC did not overlap with 0, 
indicating that stereotypes were active at both 
SOAs. 
 
--- Table 3 here --- 
 
Discussion 
Data from Experiment 1 supported our 
primary prediction that the biasing impact of 
primes on judgments would decrease as the time 
separating prime and target images increased. 
Additionally, modeling analyses showed that 
reduced stereotype application rather than 
reduced stereotype activation corresponded with 
reductions in bias. As time between prime and 
target increased, participants were less likely to 
apply prime-activated threat stereotypes. 
Additionally, an unexpected finding emerged 
from Experiment 1; stereotype activation was 
higher when SOA was longer versus shorter. This 
means that stereotype activation was highest 
when judgments showed the least amount of 
racial bias. 
 																																																													
7 The detection and guessing parameters were not 
meaningfully impacted by experimental 
Experiment 2 
Rationale 
The primary goal of Experiment 2 was to 
closely replicate the aforementioned exploratory 
findings from Experiment 1. To be explicit, we 
now expected that estimates of stereotype 
activation would again be higher at longer versus 
shorter SOA. A secondary goal was to more 
deeply investigate the efficiency of stereotyping 
processes. In Experiment 1, we sought to 
understand the relationships among stereotype 
activation, stereotype application, and stereotypic 
judgment at the presumed boundaries of strategic 
responding. Early semantic priming research 
suggested that SOAs under 400-ms eliminated 
such processes (Neely, 1977). However, more 
recent work suggests that a strict threshold of 
400-ms SOA is likely untenable (Hutchison, 
2007). In fact, Hutchison (2007) found that the 
use of strategic response strategies could be seen 
at SOAs as brief as 250-ms. Additionally, 
controlled faking of responses to evaluative 
priming tasks is possible, even with a relatively 
brief SOA (i.e., 280-ms) and brief response 
windows (i.e., 600-ms; Teige-Mocigemba & 
Klauer, 2013; also see Teige-Mocigemba & 
Klauer, 2008). In Experiment 1, we showed that 
stereotyping processes were diminished with a 
350-ms SOA compared to a 150-ms SOA. To 
further examine the efficiency profile of 
stereotype control processes, in Experiment 2 we 
tested whether greater control would be observed 
with an SOA of 200-ms versus an SOA of 150-
ms.  While we did not have strong a priori 
predictions for the 200-ms condition, we felt such 
a condition would be informative. If stereotypic 
bias is reduced by an additional 50-ms (from 150-
ms to 200-ms SOA), this would provide evidence 
that control is possible even at 200-ms, well 
below Neely’s (1977) initial boundary.  
To accomplish these goals, we modified 
Experiment 1’s procedure by adding a third 200-
ms SOA level. This additional 200-ms SOA level 
exactly corresponds to conditions used in the 
SMT’s initial validation (see Krieglmeyer & 
Sherman, 2012). Thus, each of the 144 trials was 
assigned to 150-ms, 200-ms, or 325-ms SOA. 
manipulations in any of the present experiments. For 
simplicity, these parameters are not discussed further. 
In	press,	Personality	and	Social	Psychology	Bulletin	 9	
Participants 
Seventy-five undergraduate students at the 
University of California, Davis participated in 
Experiment 2 for partial course credit (82.2 
percent Female, Mage = 19.4 years; 52 percent 
Asian, 26 percent Caucasian, 19 percent Latino/a, 
3 percent Black). Five participants were excluded 
from analyses according to our a priori standards. 
Including all data in analyses does not change the 
direction or statistical conclusions of the reported 
results. Based on effect size estimates from 
Experiment 1 (dz = .430), 45 participants were 
necessary to detect a similar effect at 1-β = .80 
power. However, we expected that adding an 
additional within-subjects level of the SOA 
manipulation would reduced the number of data 
points informing estimate at each level of SOA. 
Given this additional uncertainty, we sought to 
obtain a similar number of participants to 
Experiment 1. Using G*Power and multiTree 
power analyses, we estimated that the final 
sample of 70 provided power greater than 1-β = 
.95 to detect effects of the 150-ms versus 325-ms 
SOA manipulation on the SMT effect, SAP, and 
SAC at levels similar to Experiment 1 (Faul et al., 
2009; Monshagen, 2010). To consider 
experimental power comparing 150-ms to 200-
ms, we conducted sensitivity analyses that 
showed a sample of 70 would provide .80 power 
to detect an effect size as small as dz = .300. 
Results  
SMT Effects. Repeated-measures ANOVA 
indicated that the SMT effect again differed 
across SOA, F(1.81,138)8 = 4.868, p = .011, ωp2= 
.052. 9  Replicating Experiment 1, simple 
comparisons revealed that the SMT effect was 
stronger at 150-ms SOA than 325-ms, F(1,69) = 
11.16, p = .001, gav = .291 CIdifference[.038,.150]. 
However, the SMT effect did not statistically 
differ between 150-ms and 200-ms SOA (F(1,69) 
= 2.52, p = .117, gav = .125 CIdifference[-.011,.095]) 
or between 200-ms and 325-ms SOA (F(1,69) = 
2.18, p = .144, gav = .150 CIdifference[-.018,.122]). 
Multinomial Modeling Analyses. When fit 
to the data, the model G2 statistic suggested that 
the fit of the SMT model was acceptable, and that 																																																													
8 Huynh-Feldt correction applied for violation of 
sphericity. 
9 As in Experiment 1, including the target type factor 
and the neutral level of the prime type factor does not 
the magnitude of misfit controlling for power was 
small, G2(6) = 10.519, p = .104, w = .032.  
 
--- Figure 2 here --- 
 
The effect of SOA on the SAP parameter 
replicated, ΔG2(2) = 17.431, p < .001. Active 
stereotypes were marginally more likely to be 
applied at 150-ms SOA than 200-ms, ΔG2(1) = 
3.777, p = .052, w = .019 and reliably more likely 
to be applied 325-ms, ΔG2(1) = 17.348, p < .001, 
w = .040 (see Figure 2). Further, the SAP estimate 
at 200-ms SOA was higher than at 325-ms, 
ΔG2(1) = 4.949, p = .026, w = .022. Thus, 
participants were less likely to apply activated 
stereotypes at longer versus shorter SOA. 
The impact of SOA on the SAC parameter 
also replicated the results from Experiment 1. 
SAC parameters could not be constrained across 
the three levels, ΔG2(2) = 6.823, p = .033, w = 
.025. The SAC estimate at 150-ms SOA did not 
detectably differ from the estimate at 200-ms, 
(ΔG2(1) = 1.680, p = .195, w = .012), but was 
reliably lower than the estimate at 325-ms 
(ΔG2(1) = 6.700, p = .010, w = .025). SAC 
estimates at 200-ms SOA and 325-ms did not 
differ, ΔG2(1) = 1.641, p = .200, w = .013. 
Replicating the exploratory SAC result from 
Experiment 1 increases our confidence that 
stereotype activation is higher at longer versus 
shorter SOA. 
Discussion 
Experiment 2 provided additional support for 
the hypothesis that increasing the time between 
racial primes and target images mitigates the 
magnitude of racial bias in judgment. 
Furthermore, stereotype application (SAP) was 
lower with the 325-ms SOA than the 150-ms 
SOA. As in Experiment 1, differences in 
stereotype application rather than activation 
corresponded with the lower levels of racial bias 
observed at longer SOA. In fact, when stereotype 
activation was highest, judgments showed the 
least amount of racial bias.  
Although the comparison between 150-ms 
and 200-ms was not significant for the SMT 
change the pattern of results (i.e., significant racial 
bias and moderation by SOA level). 	
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effect or SAC, a general trend of decreased bias 
and SAC was observed. Moreover, SAP was 
marginally lower at 200-ms SOA versus 150-ms 
SOA. Thus, it appears that stereotype correction 
is possible, even at 200-ms.10  
The increase in stereotype activation at longer 
SOA appears to be at odds with aspects of 
existing theory and research. There are several 
reasons to expect that stereotype activation 
should decrease as SOA increases. First, priming 
research suggests that the activation of concepts 
fades over time (e.g., Kunda et al., 2002). Second, 
previous research suggests that stereotypes are 
relied upon to a greater extent when controlled 
processing is constrained because they are needed 
as efficient social judgment tools/heuristics 
(Macrae, Milne, & Bodenhausen, 1994). As such, 
when processing resources, such as time, are 
restricted, stereotype activation should increase 
to promote efficient decision-making. Finally, 
other work suggests that stereotype activation 
itself can be inhibited. If this process is time-
dependent, then stereotype activation would be 
reduced at longer SOA. However, the data did not 
corroborate any of these accounts. Instead, 
stereotype activation increased as SOA increased. 
Experiment 3 directly tested one plausible reason 
why stereotype activation might increase—
increased processing of priming imagery.  
Experiment 3 
Rationale  
Experiments 1 and 2 found and replicated the 
finding that stereotype activation is higher as 
SOA increases. Experiments 3 and 4 sought to 
further characterize the nature of this increase. 
One possibility is that participants might 
continually process the prime images during the 
longer interstimulus interval. Greater time and 
effort spent processing the primes would increase 
stereotype activation. In Experiment 3, 
participants completed a simple recognition 
memory test to determine whether increases in 
stereotype activation corresponded with better 
memory for prime images. If primes receive 																																																													
10 A sample of 101 participants would provide 80% 
power to detect a similar impact of SOA (150-ms vs. 
200-ms) on SAP (where w = .019). A sample of 173 
would be required to provide 80% power to detect a 
similar impact of SOA (150-ms vs. 200-ms) on the 
SMT effect (where dz = .190). 
additional processing at longer SOA, then they 
should be recognized at higher rates in the 
memory test (Bower & Karlin, 1974). 
Participants 
Forty-nine undergraduate students at the 
University of California, Davis participated in 
Experiment 3 for partial course credit (84.4 
percent Female, Mage = 20.4 years; 49 percent 
Asian, 18 percent Caucasian, 25 percent Latino/a, 
6 percent Black). We sought to collect a sample 
of at least 48 participants according to our 
preregistered plan on the Open Science 
Framework11 to achieve .90 power to detect an 
effect of dz = .430. Seven participants were 
excluded according to our preregistered criteria, 
resulting in a final sample of 42. Including all 
data in analyses does not change the direction or 
statistical conclusions of the reported results. 
Design 
The design of Experiment 3 was similar to 
Experiment 1, with one modification: The SMT 
consisted of a single block of 96 trials in which 
participants encountered 16 prime images of each 
type (Black, White, neutral. This modification 
permitted us to retain 12 unseen prime images 
that were used as lures on the recognition test (see 
below). Each of the primes was randomly chosen 
to be presented either at the 150-ms or the 325-
ms SOA, and was presented once with a high 
threat target and once with a low threat target. 
Prime-Recognition Task. Directly after 
completing the SMT procedure, participants 
completed the recognition memory measure. 
Twenty-four previously shown ‘old’ prime 
images and 8 ‘new’ lure images were presented 
in a random order, and participants were asked to 
judge whether or not each image had appeared in 
the previous task. 
Results  
SMT Effects. Surprisingly, a paired-samples 
t-test indicated that the SMT effect did not differ 
across SOA, t(41) = -.671, p = .506, gav = -.059, 
CIdifference[-.084,.042]. 12  Moreover, we did not 
11 Preregistration available at https://osf.io/2xws8/ 
12 Including the target type factor and neutral level 
within the prime type factor does not change this 
pattern of results. 
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observe significant racial bias at either SOA 
level, p’s > .7. We reflect on this further in the 
discussion below. 
Multinomial Modeling Analyses. The fit of 
the SMT model appeared acceptable and the 
magnitude of misfit controlling for power was 
small, G2(4) = 2.133, p = .711, w = .023. 
Importantly, longer SOA again led to an 
increase in SAC, ΔG2(2) = 6.828, p = .030, w = 
.041. In contrast, SOA had no detectable effect on 
SAP, ΔG2(2) = .246, p = .620, w = .008. 
Recognition Memory. We computed an 
index of recognition accuracy for each participant 
by first calculating the proportion of prime 
images correctly identified as old (Hits) and 
subtracted from that the proportion of lures 
incorrectly identified as old (False Alarms). 
Accuracy was above chance performance at both 
150-ms and 325-ms SOA (p’s < .001). Critically, 
and consistent with our preregistered predictions, 
recognition memory was higher at 325-ms than at 
150-ms SOA, t(41) = 7.717, p < .001; gav = .886, 
CIdifference[.146,.250]. 
Discussion 
Experiment 3 again found evidence that 
increases in SOA led to increases in stereotype 
activation. Consistent with the hypothesis that 
primes received additional processing when SOA 
was long, recognition memory was better for 
primes when SOA was 325-ms versus 150-ms. 
Despite high statistical power for the fully within-
subject design, the impact of SOA on the SMT 
effect and on SAP did not replicate the 
relationships found in Experiments 1 and 2. 
Neither did this study find evidence of racial bias 
in people’s judgments. These results were 
unexpected given the robust stereotypic biases 
and effects of SOA observed in Experiments 1, 2, 
and 4. It is unclear whether the absence of an 
effect is a statistical anomaly or due to an 
unidentified moderating variable.13 To be clear, 
there were no changes in the paradigm that we 
expected to change the otherwise robust effect of 
SOA. 																																																													
13 One highly speculative possibility, which we do 
not have adequate data to test, is that the heavily 
publicized shooting of concertgoers in Las Vegas 
occurred the week prior to data collection. Having 
such a salient exemplar of a White male committing a 
violent act could increase the accessibility of 
Experiment 4 
Rationale  
Experiment 3 demonstrated that longer 
relative to shorter SOA produced greater 
stereotype activation and led to better memory for 
prime images. Both of these results are consistent 
with the idea that participants were continuing to 
process the primes during the interstimulus 
interval. Experiment 4 sought to test whether this 
additional processing was perceptual or 
conceptual in nature. It is possible that iconic 
memory increases the length of time that prime 
images are available in visual working memory 
on trials with longer versus shorter SOA. Each of 
the previous experiments presented prime images 
for 150-ms each, but Sperling’s (1960) partial 
report paradigm demonstrates that iconic 
representations can persist after offset of visual 
stimuli for up to 1000-ms in visual working 
memory. An iconic memory interpretation would 
suggest that stereotype activation was highest at 
longer SOA levels because prime images were 
accessible in visual working memory for a longer 
period of time. Orthogonally manipulating the 
presence of a backward-visual mask while 
holding SOA constant is a straightforward test of 
this possible explanation for increasing 
stereotype activation. An iconic representation 
explanation predicts that stereotype activation 
will increase at higher SOA only when primes are 
not masked. In contrast, if increased processing of 
the conceptual meaning and associations of the 
primes is responsible, then the increase in 
activation should be observed regardless of 
masking. 
Participants 
Fifty-eight undergraduate students at the 
University of California, Davis participated for 
partial course credit (70.7 percent Female, Mage = 
20.6 years, 59 percent Asian, 19 percent 
Caucasian, 21 percent Latino/a, 2 percent Black). 
We sought a sample of at least 52 to set power at 
.80 to detect an effect of dz = .4. According to our 
a priori criteria, two participants were excluded 
associations between White males and threat, 
eliminating the otherwise robust stereotypic biases 
we observed in each of our other experiments. A 
priori, we expected Experiment 3 to produce the 
same effects of SOA as observed in Experiments 1, 2, 
and 4. 
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from analyses. Including all data in analyses does 
not change the direction or statistical conclusions 
of the reported results. 
Procedure 
Experiment 4’s procedure was similar to that 
of Experiment 1, with the following 
modifications. First, on half of the SMT trials we 
backward masked prime stimuli for 25-ms. The 
mask was sized to the same dimensions as prime 
stimuli and consisted of a visual black and white 
static pattern. An equivalent 25-ms of blank 
screen appeared on trials on which prime stimuli 
were not masked. Thus, the shorter SOA was 
175-ms (150-ms prime presentation plus either 
25-ms mask or 25-ms blank screen) and the 
longer SOA was 350-ms (150-ms prime 
presentation plus either 25-ms mask or 25-ms 
blank screen plus 175-ms blank screen). The 
mask factor was manipulated orthogonally, 
resulting in a 3 (prime-type: Black vs. White vs. 
neutral) × 2 (target-type: high vs. low) × 2 (SOA: 
175-ms vs. 350-ms) × 2 (prime mask: masked vs. 
unmasked) fully within-subjects design. As the 
SOA manipulation selectively influenced only 
the SAC and SAP model parameters, we sought 
to increase the precision of estimates for these 
parameters by increasing the proportion of trials 
with race primes relative to trials with the neutral 
prime. Experiment 4 included 64 Black, 64 
White, and 32 neutral prime trials for a total of 
160 trials per participant. 
Results  
SMT Effects. SMT effect estimates were 
compiled and entered into a 2 (SOA: 175-ms vs. 
350-ms) by 2 (mask: masked primes vs. 
unmasked primes) repeated-measures ANOVA 
model. Replicating Experiments 1 and 2, there 
was a main effect of SOA on the SMT effect, 
F(1,55) = 40.113, p < .001, ωp2= .407 (see Figure 
3). 14  SMT effects were stronger at the shorter 
175-ms SOA than the longer 350-ms SOA, t(55) 
= 6.333, p <.001, gav = .468. Although there was 
no main effect of the mask manipulation (F(1,55) 
= 0.550, p = .461, ωp2 < .001), an interaction 
between SOA and mask emerged (F(1,55) = 																																																													
14 As in each of the previous Experiments, including 
the target type factor and the neutral level of the 
prime type factor does not change the pattern of 
results (i.e., significant racial bias and moderation by 
7.565, p = .008, ωp2 = .103). When primes were 
not masked, there was a strong effect of SOA on 
the SMT effect, t(55) = 5.407, p < .001, gav = .622. 
When primes were masked, the effect of SOA on 
the SMT effect was still significant, but 
marketedly smaller in magnitude, t(55) = 2.462, 
p = .017,  gav = .221. Thus, masking primes 
dampened the influence of SOA on the SMT 
effect. We then examined simple effects looking 
within each SOA level. In contrast to the 
predictions from the iconic memory account, the 
effect of masking primes changed SMT effects at 
short SOA (t(55) = 2.659, p = .010, gav = .265) 
and had no detectable impact at long SOA (t(55) 
= -1.545, p = .128, gav = -.169. 
 
--- Figure 3 here --- 
 
Multinomial Modeling Analyses. For each 
SMT model parameter, we generated two 
models–one that permitted the free interaction of 
the SOA and mask factors and one that allowed 
only main effects. The restricted main effects 
model was then compared against the interaction 
model, with significant ΔG2 indicating the 
presence of an interaction between the two 
factors. The SMT model provided a good 
approximation to the data, G2(8) = 5.559, p = 
.696, w = .026. 
Once again, increasing SOA from 25-ms to 
200-ms led to higher SAC, ΔG2(1) = 9.316, p = 
.002, w = .032 (see Table 3). As a main effect, 
masking prime stimuli produced a small but 
detectable increase in SAC versus not masking 
primes, ΔG2(1) = 4.260, p = .039, w = .019. This 
result is the opposite of what would be predicted 
by the iconic memory account. The critical 
prediction from the iconic memory interpretation 
is an interaction between SOA and mask, such 
that masking primes reduces SAC, but only when 
SOA is long. There was no evidence of the 
critical SOA × Mask interaction, ΔG2(1) = 1.274, 
p = .259.  
Replicating experiments 1 and 2, SAP was 
higher when SOA was shorter versus longer, 
ΔG2(1) = 55.251, p < .001, w = .078. Masking 
SOA level). There is also a significant three-way 
interaction between prime, SOA, and mask that 
corresponds to the interaction between SOA and 
mask reported here. 
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prime stimuli decreased SAP versus not masking 
primes, ΔG2(1) = 35.506, p < .001, w = .061. 
There was an interaction between SOA and mask 
on the SAP parameter, ΔG2(1) = 11.010, p < .001. 
Simple comparisons revealed that SOA had a 
strong effect on SAP when primes were not 
masked, ΔG2(1) = 21.049, p < .001, w = .049. 
SOA had a significant but attenuated effect on 
SAP when primes were masked, ΔG2(1) = 9.721, 
p = .002, w = .033.  
Recognition Memory. Recognition accuracy 
was indexed using the hits minus false alarms 
index used in Experiment 3.15 We entered this 
into a repeated-measures ANOVA testing the 
effects of SOA and backward mask. Replicating 
Experiment 3, recognition for prime images was 
better at 200-ms SOA compared to 25-ms SOA, 
F(1,55) = 129.155, p < .001, ωp2 = .692. 
Recognition was directionally reduced when 
primes were backward masked, but this effect did 
not approach significance, F(1,55) = 1.552, p = 
.218, ωp2 = .010. There also was no interaction 
between SOA and the backward mask, F(1,55) = 
1.450, p = .234, ωp2 = .008. 
Discussion 
The primary goal of Experiment 4 was to test 
whether increases in SAC at longer SOA were the 
result of additional perceptual processing of 
prime images in iconic memory. If true, masking 
prime stimuli would interact with the SOA factor. 
We found no evidence for this critical interaction. 
Instead we found that backward masking prime 
stimuli, if anything, appeared to modestly 
increase stereotype activation. In concert with the 
recognition memory results from Experiment 3, 
this pattern of results suggests that prime images 
receive greater conceptual, rather than 
perceptual, processing when SOA is longer. 
Within-paper Meta-analysis 
We sought to quantify the effect of SOA on 
our three variables of interest across the four 
reported experiments. To do this, we conducted 
mixed-effects meta-analytic tests using the 																																																													
15 For full transparency, we wish to make clear that 
the recognition memory measure was not 
preregistered as in Experiment 3. Nevertheless, our 
predictions were the same; longer SOA should be 
expected to correspond with higher SAC as well as 
higher recognition accuracy. 
‘metafor’ package in the open source R platform 
(R Development Core Team, 2010; Viechtbauer, 
2010). We aggregated data from short (150-175-
ms) and long (325-350-ms) SOA conditions and 
converted each effect size statistic to the r 
correlation coefficient (Lakens, 2013). 
The meta-analytic estimate for the effect of 
SOA on the SMT effect was significant, Z = 
2.639, p = .008, r = .387 CI95%[.105,.612]. 
Additionally, there was detectable heterogeneity 
(Q(3) = 20.294, p < .001), indicating that we 
should reject the null hypothesis that the present 
experiments were examining the same effect of 
SOA on the SMT effect (Higgins, Thompson, 
Deeks, & Altman, 2003). In other words, 
detecting heterogeneity implies that the effect of 
SOA on the SMT effect was moderated by a third 
variable.16 
 
--- Figure 4 here --- 
 
The effect of SOA on the SAC model 
parameter was significant, Z = 3.128, p = .002, r 
= .190 CI95%[.072,.304]. There was no evidence 
for heterogeneity, Q(3) = .225, p = .974. 
 
--- Figure 5 here --- 
 
The effect of SOA on the SAP model 
parameter was significant, Z = 3.437, p < .001, r 
= .208 CI95%[.091,.320]. There was no evidence 
for heterogeneity, Q(3) = 4.223, p = .238. 
 
--- Figure 6 here --- 
 
Taken together, these within-paper meta-
analyses indicate that increasing SOA had a 
reliable impact on reducing both the SMT effect 
and stereotype application (SAP), as well as on 




16 We conducted follow-up meta-analytic tests to 
determine if any variables statistically accounted for 
heterogeneity of SOA on the SMT effect. No clear 
conclusions emerged from these tests that could 
account for the heterogeneity observed. 
In	press,	Personality	and	Social	Psychology	Bulletin	 14	
General Discussion 
The present research sought to understand the 
roles of basic mechanisms thought to underlie 
stereotypic biases in social judgment—stereotype 
activation and stereotype application. We 
manipulated the amount of time separating 
stereotypic primes and social targets, finding that 
increases in time reduced the magnitude of 
stereotypic bias. Two mechanistic accounts could 
have explained this reduction in bias. First, 
reductions in stereotyping could have 
corresponded with decays or suppression of 
stereotype activation. Second, reductions in 
stereotyping could have corresponded instead 
with reductions in stereotype application. We 
found strong evidence for the second possibility. 
When the two basic stereotyping mechanisms 
were independently estimated with the SMT 
processing tree model, shifts in stereotype 
application corresponded with stereotypic biases 
in peoples’ social judgments. In contrast, 
stereotype activation appeared to play a 
subordinate role to stereotype application. In fact, 
stereotype activation consistently increased with 
time, even as stereotypic biases in peoples’ 
judgments decreased. This means that stereotypes 
were most active when stereotype-congruent 
biases in judgment were weakest. The present 
work demonstrates that stereotype activation 
might not necessarily always result in biased 
judgment, and that preventing the application of 
activated stereotypes can be an effective strategy 
to reduce bias. 
Stereotyping: Automaticity, Control, and 
Operating Conditions 
The present results shed light on the operating 
conditions of the basic mechanisms of stereotype 
activation and application. We tested our 
hypotheses using an indirect measure of 
stereotyping that reflects unintentional racial 
biases and manipulated SOA at levels assumed to 
preclude deliberative processing. Under these 
conditions, we found evidence for the modulation 
of both stereotype activation and application, 
indicating that these processes are more dynamic 
over even short periods of time than previously 
thought (but see Cunningham, Zelazo, Packer, & 
Van Bavel, 2007). In terms of stereotype 
application, this finding is consistent with both 
the Compensatory Automaticity model of 
stereotyping (Glaser & Kihlstrom, 2006), which 
proposes that stereotype-corrective processes 
themselves can proceed rapidly (i.e., at SOAs 
assumed to preclude controlled processes; Neely, 
1977), and the suggestion from the Quadruple 
process model of implicit social cognition 
(Sherman et al., 2008) that associative biases can 
be overcome relatively quickly and efficiently 
(Calanchini & Sherman, 2013). At the same time, 
we found that even short increases of time 
between racial primes and target images affected 
the likelihood of applying stereotypic 
information in judgments. Participants were most 
likely to apply active stereotypes when brief 
periods of time separated prime and target 
images. Experiment 2 found that stereotype 
application was diminished at each stepwise 
increase in time separating racial primes and 
target images. Thus, stereotype application and 
control over it, though relatively quick, is not an 
entirely automatic process. 
Interestingly and unexpectedly, we also found 
that stereotype activation was greater when there 
was more time between primes and targets. We 
initially hypothesized that additional time would 
reduce rather than increase stereotype activation 
due to enhanced suppression or passive decay. 
However, there was no evidence in our 
experiments that stereotype activation decayed or 
was suppressed as time increased. It is possible 
that our activation results reflect the fact that 
stereotype activation is not entirely efficient, and 
requires time to unfold (Gilbert & Hixon, 1991). 
We think that it is more likely that these results 
reflect the fact that the extent of even highly 
efficient processes can be increased by additional 
processing. Indeed, we found evidence from a 
measure of recognition accuracy that primes were 
attended to and processed more thoroughly at 
longer versus shorter SOAs. Evidence from the 
backward masking manipulation suggested that 
this additional processing is conceptual, rather 
than perceptual, in nature.  
An important caveat is that our conclusions 
about the operating conditions of stereotype 
activation and application were based on a 
specific manipulation of processing resources: 
time. Other manipulations, such as a cognitive 
load (Gilbert & Hixon, 1991), may yield different 
conclusions. An alternative explanation 
regarding stereotype activation draws on the 
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‘goal looms larger’ effect (e.g., Goschke & Kuhl, 
1993). In contrast to semantic priming where we 
might expect rapid decay in concept activation, 
goal priming has been shown to lead to increased 
accessibility over time until the goal is fulfilled. 
Based on research on intergroup emotions (e.g., 
Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005; Mackie & Smith, 
2002), it seems likely that our prime pictures may 
have activated an emotional-motivational state of 
threat, fear, and corresponding goals for 
protection. As a consequence, the accessibility of 
threat representations may have increased over 
time because they were relevant to goals for 
protection. Further research is needed to further 
delineate the conditions under which our 
observations hold. 
Self-Regulating Implicit Biases: Cognitive 
Mechanisms 
Results from the present study underscore the 
importance of researching the basic mechanisms 
underlying the ability to mitigate stereotypic 
biases. A comprehensive understanding of these 
basic mechanisms will provide the basis for 
developing effective interventions. For example, 
consider accounts of stereotyping that suggest 
that stereotype activation is the primary driver of 
biased judgments (e.g., Bargh, 1999). In these 
accounts, when stereotypic knowledge is 
accessible, judgments are influenced in an 
assimilative fashion, perhaps inevitably 
producing downstream bias, particularly under 
conditions thought to interfere with control (e.g., 
lack of time or cognitive resources; Devine, 1989; 
Fazio et al., 1995). Indeed, consistent with this 
proposal, we found that people generally tended 
to apply active stereotypes across each of the 
experiments. 
However, challenging the activation-
dominant perspective, the extent of stereotype 
activation could not account for the magnitude of 
peoples’ biases in the current research. The 
magnitude of racial bias in judgments and 
stereotype activation were dissociated. This is 
difficult to reconcile with theorizing that posits a 
direct and inevitable pathway from stereotype 
activation to stereotypic bias (e.g., Bargh, 1999). 
Even when stereotype activation was strong, 
participants were able to prevent the application 
of stereotypes under suboptimal conditions that 
are presumed to interfere with strategic 
processes. This does not necessarily mean that 
interventions aimed at reducing stereotype 
activation via suppression or other means, or by 
changing stereotypic knowledge outright will be 
unsuccessful. There is no question that such 
reductions in activation can reduce bias. At the 
very least, reducing activation bypasses the need 
to inhibit the application of stereotypes. 
Nevertheless, the present results suggest that the 
relationship between stereotype activation and 
stereotyping is more nuanced than is sometimes 
described. Even under conditions that make 
control difficult, the present results showed that 
stereotyping was more dependent on the extent of 
stereotype application than activation. 
Practically, this suggests that interventions to 
reduce bias should emphasize the role of practice 
in correcting for the influence of active 
stereotypes (e.g., Calanchini, Gonsalkorale, 
Sherman, & Klauer, 2013; Kawakami, Dovidio, 
Moll, Hermsen, & Russin, 2000).		
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Table 1. Proportion “more threatening” responses as a function of prime (White vs. Neutral vs. Black), target (low vs. high threat), and 
experimental level for Experiments 1-4. 
 White prime  Neutral prime  Black prime 
  Low threat High threat   Low threat High threat   Low threat High threat 
Experiment 1         
  150-ms SOA .23 (.21) .29 (.24)  .27 (.27) .42 (.30)  .49 (.30) .54 (.27) 
  325-ms SOA .36 (.24) .40 (.24)  .28 (.28) .41 (.31)  .54 (.29) .55 (.26) 
Experiment 2          
  150-ms SOA .28 (.20) .31 (.20)  .25 (.28) .40 (.29)  .49 (.27) .51 (.25) 
  200-ms SOA .33 (.21) .36 (.22)  .27 (.29) .41 (.30)  .51 (.27) .52 (.30) 
  325-ms SOA .38 (.24) .42 (.23)  .29 (.29) .39 (.29)  .49 (.25) .54 (.26) 
Experiment 3         
  150-ms SOA .36 (.27) .36 (.22)  .24 (.30) .31 (.32)  .33 (.30) .38 (.28) 
  325-ms SOA .38 (.26) .42 (.29)  .23 (.27) .34 (.33)  .31 (.31) .42 (.27) 
Experiment 4         
  175-ms SOA w/mask .33 (.26) .38 (.26)  .26 (.28) .31 (.32)  .49 (.30) .48 (.31) 
  175-ms SOA no mask .31 (.27) .29 (.27)  .25 (.34) .32 (.34)  .52 (.30) .52 (.27) 
  350-ms SOA w/mask .44 (.27) .46 (.25)  .29 (.35) .38 (.36)  .52 (.29) .50 (.30) 
  350-ms SOA no mask .47 (.22) .45 (.27)   .28 (.34) .36 (.35)   .44 (.32) .42 (.30) 
Note: Standard deviations appear in parentheses.        
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Table 2. Proportion “more threatening” response difference score (Black – White prime) and SMT effect size estimates in Experiment 
1 by SOA. 
  Difference Score SMT Effect dz 
Experiment 1 
  
   150-ms SOA .25 [.18, .33] .737 
   325-ms SOA .16 [.09, .23] .494 





Table 3. SMT multinomial model parameter estimates by experimental level in Experiments 1-4. 
 
Parameter Estimate D G SAC SAP 
Experiment 1     
  150-ms SOA .11 [.08, .14] .32 [.29, .34] .35 [.24, .45] .87 [.75, .99] 
  325-ms SOA .13 [.09, .17] .32 [.30, .34] .77 [.68, .86] .60 [.58, .63] 
Experiment 2      
  150-ms SOA .10 [.06, .15] .30 [.26, .33] .43 [.30, .55] .73 [.65, .81] 
  200-ms SOA .11 [.07, .16] .32 [.28, .35] .55 [.42, .68] .65 [.60, .69] 
  325-ms SOA .11 [.06, .16] .32 [.29, .36] .67 [.54, .80] .58 [.55, .61] 
Experiment 3     
  150-ms SOA .06 [.01, .11] .26 [.22, .30] .37 [.23, .52] .49 [.43 .56] 
  325-ms SOA .10 [.04, .16] .26 [.22, .30] .59 [.46, .73] .51 [.47, .56] 
Experiment 4 
    
  175-ms SOA w/mask .05 [-.02, .12] .28 [.23, .32] .61 [.48, .74] .60 [.56, .64] 
  175-ms SOA w/o mask .01 [-.05, .07] .30 [.25, .34] .55 [.40, .70] .71 [.64, .77] 
  350-ms SOA w/mask .12  [.04, .21] .29 [.24, .34] .94 [.82, 1.0] .52 [.50, .55] 
  350-ms SOA w/o mask .04 [-.03, .12] .31 [.27, .36] .66 [.50, .81] .49 [.45, .52] 




Figure 1. Multinomial processing tree of the SMT model. The top tree for trials with Black and White primes and the bottom tree for 
neutral primes. The table on the right depicts responses as a function of prime and target. The response “more threat” is represented by 
a + sign, and the response “less threat” is represented by a – sign. SAC = stereotype activation; 1-SAC = absence of stereotype 
activation; SAP = stereotype application; 1-SAP = stereotype correction; D = detection of target trait; 1-D = failure to detect target 
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Figure 2. Probability estimates of the parameters SAC (stereotype activation), SAP (stereotype application), D (target detection), and 
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Figure 6. Forest plot depicting effect of SOA on SAP by Experiment. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
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